APEC, ASEAN+3, and American Power: The History and Limits of the New Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific by Berger, Mark T. & Beeson, Mark
APEC, ASEAN+3, and American Power: 
The History and Limits of the New Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Mark T. Berger and Mark Beeson 
 
INTRODUCTION: “EAST ASIA” OR THE “ASIA-PACIFIC” 
 
The post-Cold War era has seen the simultaneous acceleration of 
economic regionalisation and increased levels of transnational political 
interaction associated with regionalism. In the 1990s both non-state-
centred and state-centred regional processes of integration have emerged 
as increasingly important counterpoints to the globalisation project and 
US globalism.1 In fact, some observers have argued that regional 
                                            
1 Björn Hettne, “Globalisation and the new regionalism: The second great transformation”, in 
Björn, et al (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism (London; Macmillan, 1999). The 
globalisation project, as the term is used here, is centred on the promotion of neo-liberalism and 
the reconfiguration of state-mediated national development projects into neo-liberal states and is 
being pursued at a wide range of sites by an increasingly unaccountable transnationalised elite. 
The globalisation project is linked, in particular, to the growing concentration of control over the 
global economy by a relatively small number of large oligopolistic transnational corporations 
that have emerged in the 1990s from dramatic merger-driven and technology-facilitated changes 
to the global political economy. Despite the increasingly oligopolistic character of global 
business operations the globalisation project is legitimated by, and promoted in the name of, a 
“free enterprise” vision of the global economy. Philip. McMichael, Development and Social 
Change: A Global Perspective (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press, second edition, 2000; 
first published 1995), pp. 350, 354. Regionalization  and globalisation, building on Payne and 
Gamble are defined as primarily non-state-centred  processes, while regionalism and globalism 
are primarily state-led processes, the latter being associated particularly with the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, and with the US in the post-Cold War era. Of course, the 
boundaries between these processes is not always clear. Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble, 
"Introduction: The Political Economy of Regionalism and World Order" in Andrew Gamble and 
Anthony Payne, eds., Regionalism and World Order (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 2, 16-17. 
Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, "Conclusion: The New Regionalism" in Andrew Gamble 
and Anthony Payne, eds., Regionalism and World Order (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 250, 
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initiatives provide important mechanisms with which to respond to, and 
take advantage of, the pressures that are commonly associated with 
globalisation.2 State-led regionalism also reflects attempts by elites, in 
both the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era to engage with or mediate US 
globalism generally and the US-led “war on terrorism” more 
specifically. In short, there are powerful incentives for state and non-
state actors based within regions to cooperate to their mutual advantage. 
However, such observations raise questions about how regions should 
be defined and who should be considered to be “authentic” members? In 
some parts of the world, most notably Western Europe, regional identity 
reflects long-standing processes of economic and political integration, 
which have been facilitated by shared political and even cultural 
practices.3 In the “Asia-Pacific”, by contrast, not only are processes of 
regional integration and coordination of more recent vintage, the very 
definition of the region has been a far more highly contested and far 
more incompletely realised project.4 In fact, the term Asia-Pacific only 
                                                                                                                                             
258. Also see Suan Breslin and Richard Higgott “Studying regions: Learning from the old, 
constructing the new” New Political Economy vol. 5, no. 3. (2000).  
 
2 See Charles Oman, Globalisation and Regionalisation: The Challenge for Developing 
Countries, (Paris: OECD, 1994). 
 
3 See, William Wallace, “The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox” Political Studies 
47, (1999). 
 
4 Arif Dirlik, “The Asia-Pacific idea: reality and representation in the invention of regional 
structure”, Journal of World History vol. 3, no. 1. (1992). Hadi Soesastro, “Pacific Economic 
Cooperation: The History of an Idea” in Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, eds., Asia Pacific 
Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations (Sydney: Harper Collins, 1994). 
Mark. T. Berger, “A New East-West Synthesis? APEC and Competing Narratives of Regional 
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gained widespread currency in the last decade or so and continues to be 
used alongside the narrower and more long-standing usage of, and 
emphasis on, “East Asia”.5 Such definitional imprecision has been 
compounded by continuing tensions within and between the Western 
and Eastern shores of the nebulous Asia-Pacific region, something that 
has made the establishment of a coherent regional political organisation 
inherently problematic. The failure of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum to even begin to realise the hopes of its 
advocates is a powerful reminder of just how difficult regional and 
political cooperation in such circumstances can be.6 
 
APEC’s failure was all too predictable.7 Set up in 1989, APEC reflected 
both a naïve belief amongst some sectors of the region’s elites that 
                                                                                                                                             
Integration in the Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific” Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane 
Governance vol. 23, no. 1. (1998). 
 
5 East Asia, which is often used to refer to Northeast Asia is also increasingly used to refer to 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. The latter usage will be followed in this article. Meanwhile, 
“Asia” is widely used to refer to all of South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. However, 
in some instances Asia is also used to refer to East Asia. In this paper this latter usage will be 
followed in some instances in which case the meaning will be clear from the context. 
 
6 The founding member nation-states of APEC were Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and the United 
States. Hong Kong, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan joined in 1991, followed by 
Mexico and Papua New Guinea in 1993. In 1994 Chile was admitted, while Peru, Russia and 
Vietnam became members in the late 1990s. For a good overview of APEC see John Ravenhill, 
APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
 
7 See Mark Beeson, “APEC: Nice theory, shame about the practice”, Australian Quarterly vol.  
68, no. 2. (1996); Mark T. Berger, “APEC And Its Enemies: The Failure of the New Regionalism 
in the Asia-Pacific” Third World Quarterly: Journal of Emerging Areas vol. 20, no. 5. (1999). 
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economic reform could be insulated from politics, and a general lack of 
US interest in an organization, which provided few benefits to 
successive administrations in Washington where there has been a 
continued, if not a growing, predilection for bilateral or unilateral 
approaches to foreign policy.8 What is of far greater long-term 
significance than the faltering APEC is the contradictory impact of US 
hegemony on regional processes. US indifference to APEC helped to 
render it obsolete, while outright hostility to more specifically East 
Asian organizations in the 1990s, especially when coupled with 
Washington’s highly interventionist role in the region with the onset of 
the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), provided a catalyst for the 
development of what may yet prove to be a more significant and 
enduring regional entity: ASEAN+3 (the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and China, Japan and South Korea). This article begins by 
exploring the limits of the new regionalism in the post-Cold War East 
Asia via a focus on the Cold War history of the region. It then turns to 
the changing character of US hegemony in the post-Cold War era. We 
emphasize that in the context of the complex shifts and continuities of 
the past five decades there are far more serious constraints on the new 
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific than in Europe, or the Americas, where 
regionalisation and regionalism is arguably most advanced. We also 
                                                                                                                                             
 
8 Coral Bell  “American ascendancy; and the pretense of concert” The National Interest, Fall 
(1999). 
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look closely at APEC and ASEAN+3, paying particular attention to the 
role of the United States, which has played a pivotal role in shaping 
regional outcomes. Finally, we consider the prospects for a distinctive 
East Asian form of regionalism grounded in a much narrower 
conception of the Asia-Pacific. We conclude that while there are 
profound limits on the coherence and unity of ASEAN+3 in the context 
of the continued salience of US power in the region, APEC has now 
clearly been displaced by ASEAN+3 as the most significant 
embodiment of the new regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
INVENTING SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
SEATO 
 
Given our emphasis on ASEAN+3 it is particularly important at the 
outset to examine the background to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and also to look at the earlier rise and eventual 
demise of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In fact, in 
contrast to Northeast Asia, what became known as Southeast Asia saw 
far more significant efforts at regionalism in the Cold War era. 
Southeast Asia (or South-East Asia) is now widely understood as that 
part of Asia that lies east of India and south of China and encompasses 
the contemporary nation-states of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam and most recently East Timor. However, the concerted 
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treatment of Southeast Asia as a distinct historical, political, economic 
and geographical unit is of relatively recent origin. While usage of the 
term can be traced back to the nineteenth century, it only gained 
currency amongst scholars, colonial officials, policy-makers and 
nationalist leaders in the 1930s and early 1940s. For example, 
“Southeast Asia” was used by the end of the 1930s in various reports 
and documents by the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was founded 
in Honolulu in 1925 to promote understanding in the Pacific. Between 
1943 and 1946 the theatre of war under the overall direction of Lord 
Mountbatten was identified as the “South-East Asia Command”; 
however, the territory covered by the South-East Asia Command, the 
boundaries of which were expanded in the waning days of the war, 
never included the Philippines or all of French Indochina. Meanwhile, in 
the early post-1945 era the French government sought to promote a 
“Southeast Asia Union” centred on its colonies in the region as part of 
its effort to retain its possessions and its influence. This was countered 
by the “Southeast Asian League”, which was set-up in 1947 by the 
Laotian Prince, Souphanouvong (the so-called Red Prince) who became 
its first General Secretary. In its relatively short existence the Southeast 
Asian League sought to mobilize regional opposition to colonialism. 
The subsequent formation of the South-East Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) in 1954 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in 1967 and the growing currency of the term during the 
Vietnam War, and the Cold War more generally, was complemented by 
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the proliferation of Southeast Asian area specialists and courses on 
Southeast Asia at universities and colleges inside and outside of 
Southeast Asia. 9 
 
Northeast Asia, meanwhile, was the pivot of the particularly complex 
territorial and geo-political intersection of the People’s Republic of 
China, Japan, the USSR and the United States, while the Cold War 
divisions between North and South Korea and between the Chinese 
mainland and Taiwan had also solidified by the 1950s and remains in 
place to this day. The geo-political and geo-economic imperatives of the 
Cold War had a profound influence on the shape and limits of 
regionalism in Northeast Asia where the US developed major bilateral 
relationships with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, at the same time as 
relations even between these three ostensibly Cold War allies (but 
erstwhile colonizer and colonized) remained relatively limited in the 
early period. By the end of the 1940s, meanwhile, the US had embarked 
on a full-scale effort to facilitate the industrial rebirth of Japan, and turn 
as much of Northeast Asia as possible into a capitalist bulwark against 
the USSR and Mao’s China.10 With the onset of the Korean War (1950-
                                            
9 See Russell H. Fifield, “The Concept of Southeast Asia: Origins, Development and Evaluation” 
South-East Asian Spectrum vol. 4, no. 1. October (1975). Donald Emmerson, “Southeast Asia-
What’s in a Name?” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies vol. 15. no. 1. (1984). Also see Geoffrey 
C. Gunn, Theravadins, Colonialists and Commissars in Laos (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998). 
 
10 Bruce Cumings, “Japan in the World-System” in Andrew Gordon, ed., Post-War Japan as 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
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1953), the governmental and military institutions and bureaucratic 
structures of the US national security state were increasingly 
consolidated as instruments of regional and global power.11 In terms of 
institutionalising and amplifying Washington’s commitment to the Cold 
War generally and the Cold War in Northeast Asia more specifically, 
the Korean War was an unequivocal turning point.12 At the same time, 
a major result of Washington’s strategic engagement with the Northeast 
Asian region during the Cold War was a network of primarily bilateral 
security alliances, which in the long term served to inhibit intra-regional 
cooperation.13 
 
This is in sharp contrast to Western Europe, where the US moved to 
encourage multilateral defence arrangements and also supported the 
push for some form of economic and eventually political integration. 
This was done, despite the fact that a narrow conception of political 
                                            
11 Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1993). Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1992). Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National 
Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
12 On the roots of the conflict see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War I: Liberation 
and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, 
first published 1981). Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War II: The Roaring of the 
Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
 
13 Bruce Cumings, “Japan and Northeast Asia into the twenty-first century” in Peter J. 
Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, (eds.), Network Power: Japan and Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997). For  a good overview see Roger Buckley, The United States in the Asia-
Pacific Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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advantage would have calculated that the US would benefit more from 
bilateral ties with specific nation-states in Western Europe. In the 
immediate post-1945 era, policy-makers in Washington assumed that 
the US and Western European governments would have complementary 
interests in relation to most geo-political issues, while economic 
integration would strengthen economic progress and industrial 
development in Europe.14 In 1947 the Marshall Plan for Western 
Europe (which also involved aid for Japan and South Korea) 
demonstrated US economic power and commitment in the emerging 
Cold War.15 After 1947 and the division of Europe into US and Soviet 
spheres of influence was institutionalised with the establishment of a 
US-led military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), in 1949-1950 and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact in May 1955. 
 
Meanwhile, Southeast Asia had emerged by the 1950s as a major arena 
of the Cold War.16 In February 1955, following the dramatic military 
defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the US presided 
                                            
14 Geir Lundestad, “Empire” By Integration: The United States and European Integration (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 
15 Kees van der Pijl, The Making of An Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 138-
177. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western 
Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; first published 1987). 
 
16 Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast 
Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, 
Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1995). 
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over the establishment of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) which was comprised of the governments of the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, Pakistan, Thailand and 
the Philippines. SEATO was established less as a regional security 
organization (most of its member nation-states were not even located in 
“Southeast Asia”) and more as a broad military alliance to defend South 
Vietnam. However, even as a military alliance it was of limited 
significance. A number of military exercises were arranged and 
conducted under the auspices of SEATO, but the organization never 
assumed an active military role even at the height of the Vietnam War. 
SEATO, with its headquarters in Bangkok, nevertheless symbolized the 
formalization of the US commitment to Southeast Asia, at a time when 
the Eisenhower administration had embarked on an increasingly costly 
attempt to help establish a stable non-communist nation-state in the 
southern part of Vietnam under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem.17 
 
As the 1960s began the Diem regime was the fifth highest recipient of 
US foreign aid worldwide (and it was the third highest recipient--after 
South Korea and Taiwan--amongst non-NATO countries).18 By the end 
                                            
17 Robert J McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World 
War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 60-79. Also see David Kaiser, 
American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
 
18 When Kennedy entered the White House in 1961 over 1,500 US citizens were already based in 
Saigon, employed in various public administration posts or serving with the Military Assistance 
and Advisory Group (MAAG) which advised and trained the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
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of the decade, however, it was clear that there were profound limits on 
Washington’s ability to preside over the emergence of a stable non-
communist South Vietnam.19 In broader terms the limits of US 
hegemony and the weakness of multilateralism in the region was 
reflected in the fact that SEATO had been disabled from the outset by 
internal differences and an absence of any underlying strategic interest 
around which its members could unite. The government of Pakistan 
began to drift away at an early stage because of a lack of support for its 
conflict with India. Pakistan eventually withdrew from SEATO in 
November 1972. The French government was clearly against the 
escalation of US military involvement in South Vietnam in the 1960s, 
while the British government failed to provide any real military support 
for that conflict. In fact, in July 1967 Britain formally announced its 
military disengagement from affairs to the east of Suez. Other SEATO 
members, such as the Australian, Thai and Filipino governments, did 
send troops to South Vietnam, but this was not done under the umbrella 
of SEATO. The treaty organization was further weakened by the Nixon 
                                                                                                                                             
(ARVN). By the time of the new president’s inauguration, Saigon had also become the site of the 
headquarters of the biggest US economic aid program in the world. Carlyle A. Thayer, War By 
Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam 1954-1960 (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1989), p. 123. Also see David Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower 
Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Douglas 
C. Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development: South Vietnam, 1953-1975 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
 
19 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and Modern Historical 
Experience (New York: New Press, second edition 1994, first published 1985), pp. 303-337, 341-
355. 
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administration’s historic rapprochement with China in early 1972. With 
the waning of the Vietnam War (particularly after the Paris Peace 
Agreements of January 1973) SEATO lost any vestige of relevance and 
its military structures were abolished in February 1974. The 
organization as a whole was disbanded in June 30 1977.20 
 
REINVENTING SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE RISE AND 
CONSOLIDATION OF ASEAN 
 
The failure of SEATO reflected the fact that the Cold War in Asia 
presented as much of an obstacle as a stimulus to regional organization 
even in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the deepening of the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia in the 1960s had prompted the emergence of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. While 
ASEAN was a response to security concerns on the part of the 
governments involved, the organization also placed a major emphasis on 
economic collaboration. ASEAN had been preceded by a smaller 
organization, the Association of South East Asia (ASA), which had been 
set up on 31 July 1961 by Thailand, Malaya/Malaysia and the 
Philippines. The ASA had been envisioned as an alternative to the 
already faltering SEATO, but the ASA ran aground less than two years 
                                            
20 The actual treaty that gave rise to SEATO was retained because it was the only formal military 
agreement between the United States and the government of Thailand. Leszek Buszynski, 
SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1984). 
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after its inception following the outbreak of a dispute over Sabah 
between the governments of Malaya and the Philippines. The 
organization was further undermined when Manila supported the 
Indonesian government’s territorial conflict (the so-called Konfrontasi) 
with Malaya/Malaysia. With the waning of Konfrontasi, the ASA was 
briefly resuscitated in 1966, but was dissolved in 1967 in favour of the 
newly created, and more broadly based, ASEAN. The emergence of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations, which was briefly known as 
the South East Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC), 
flowed from the conjuncture of local, regional and international 
initiatives. By the mid-1960s, anti-communist governments in Southeast 
Asia had a shared concern with local insurgencies in their respective 
nations, even though they differed with regard to the level of support 
they wanted to provide for escalating US involvement in South 
Vietnam. They were also concerned to establish a framework for 
regional negotiations in the wake of Konfrontasi between Indonesia and 
Malaysia in the early to mid-1960s.21 
 
Following a series of meetings behind closed doors in 1966 and early 
1967, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand formally promulgated the ASEAN Declaration 
                                            
21See Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the 
United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
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in Bangkok on 8 August 1967. Prior to the establishment of ASEAN, 
the general idea of regional cooperation in South East Asian and 
ASEAN more specifically had been receiving both private and public 
support from US policy-makers, academics and the print-media.22 In 
formal terms the organization’s main goals were economic and social 
cooperation; however, a key implicit objective was political cooperation 
and the founding document also embodied a desire to shape the regional 
order. These latter concerns were reflected in the organization’s 
declared commitment in November 1971 to make Southeast Asia a Zone 
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Despite such grandiose 
declarations ASEAN did very little for almost ten years after its initial 
establishment in 1967. The organization did not have its first summit 
meeting until February 1976. In the 1980s ASEAN opposed Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia; however, Vietnamese withdrawal and the end 
of the Cold War undermined the organization’s united front against 
Vietnam. The early 1990s saw a reorientation: Vietnam joined ASEAN 
in 1995, Laos joined in 1997 and Cambodia eventually joined in 1999 
(Burma—Myanmar—also became a member in 1997). By the end of the 
1990s its membership encompassed all of the nation-states in Southeast 
Asia (Brunei had already joined in 1984, and East Timor joined in 
2002). Significantly, beginning in January 1992, the organization also 
                                            
22Vincent K. Pollard, “Two Stages in American Promotion of Asian Regionalism: United States-
Southeast Asia-Japan Relations, 1945-1970” Ajiagaku-ronso (Bulletin of Asian Studies) vol. 5. 
(1995). 
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initiated a security dialogue with nation-states beyond Southeast Asia. 
The following year, the foreign ministers of ASEAN met with their 
opposite numbers from the People’s Republic of China, Russia and the 
US, as well as other Asia-Pacific governments to launch the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF). These years also saw the promulgation of a 
formal commitment to an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
Meanwhile, ASEAN played a key role in the setting up of the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM), which started operation in 1996. But 
ASEAN’s effectiveness, particularly in the wake of the human rights 
controversy surrounding the entry of Burma (Myanmar) and Cambodia 
to the organization in the late 1990s, has been questioned. An enlarged 
ASEAN has also had more difficulty in achieving consensus, while the 
Asian financial crisis contributed to the organization’s apparent 
disarray.23 
 
The end of the Cold War and organizational expansion has carried 
ASEAN into uncharted territory.24 The organization has always 
emphasized mutual respect for, and reinforced the sovereignty of, 
member nation-states and it has no commitment to political integration 
                                            
23John Funston, “ASEAN: Out of Its Depth?” Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 20, no. 1. 
(1998). 
  
24 See Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000). Amitav Acharya, Constructing A Security 
Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 
2001). Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002). 
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along the lines being pursued by the European Union (EU). These 
concerns and practices, as well as a desire to move towards a “more 
rules-based association” were reflected in the public comments in 2001 
of Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN. He observed that 
“regional agreements may need national legislation to carry them 
out…This would help strengthen the national legal systems of the 
member-states as well as the rule of law in the region as a whole”.25 
Meanwhile, the emergence of ASEAN+3 (ASEAN and China, Japan 
and South Korea) in the post-crisis period has meant that ASEAN, or at 
least some of ASEAN’s wider initiatives, have encouraged observers to 
now see it as a more significant grouping than APEC. 
 
INVENTING THE ASIA-PACIFIC: THE ORIGINS AND 
EMERGENCE OF APEC 
 
The origins of APEC can be traced to the 1960s and early 1970s against 
the wider backdrop of the reorientation of US hegemony. During the 
decades preceding the 1970s the Japanese government and Japan-based 
corporations, with US sponsorship, had gradually re-built their linkages 
with Northeast and Southeast Asia. By the 1970s, the US had been 
                                                                                                                                             
 
25 Rodolfo C. Severino, The ASEAN Way and the Rule of Law” International Law Conference 
on ASEANLegal Systems and Regional Integration (Sponsored by the Asia-Europe Institute and 
the Faculty of Law, University of Malaya) Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 2001 
(http://www.asean.or.id/newdata/asean_way.htm). 
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eclipsed by Japan as East Asia’s most significant source of foreign aid 
and investment.26 The growing regional economic significance of 
Japan, against the backdrop of the country’s post-1945 economic boom, 
was complemented by renewed efforts on the part of Japanese officials 
and economists to encourage some form of regional economic 
integration and a Pacific community. In Japan, visions of a Pacific 
community can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century when 
Japanese intellectuals began to anticipate a “Pacific Age” in global 
history.27 This was also connected to celebratory accounts of Japan’s 
industrial rise and its emergence as a major colonial power by the early 
twentieth century.28 In 1966 the Asian Development Bank was set up, 
primarily under the auspices of the Japanese government (but with 
strong support from the US).29 However, it was the promulgation of an 
“Asia-Pacific policy” by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in late 1966 that 
                                            
26 Dominic Kelly, Japan and the Reconstruction of East Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 
67-105. 
 
27 Pekka Korhonen, “The Pacific Age in World History” Journal of World History vol. 7, no. 1. 
(1996).  
 
28 Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Towards Colonialism, 1895-1945” in Ramon H. Myers 
and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
 
29 Nitish K. Dutt, “The United States and the Asian Development Bank” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia vol. 27, no. 1. (1997). Nihal Kappagoda, The Asian Development Bank 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
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is seen by some observers to have signalled the start of Japan’s effort to 
build a regional trade organization.30 
 
This led to persistent, but unsuccessful, efforts by the Japanese 
economist Kiyoshi Kojima and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to promote a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA--it was envisioned as 
encompassing the US, Japan, New Zealand, Canada and Australia) as a 
counter-weight to the European Economic Community). While PAFTA 
received limited support it did ease the way for the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council (PBEC) in April 1967, which is comprised of 
nationally based business organizations and the first Pacific Trade and 
Development conference (PAFTAD) in 1968. The latter was primarily a 
forum for economists. The lack of interest in PAFTA led Kojima to 
introduce a less ambitious proposal centered on the idea of an 
Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD) modelled on 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
This proposal also languished until the late 1970s when it was revived in 
a report for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations written by 
prominent US economist, Hugh Patrick and Peter Drysdale (an 
influential Australian economist). It was proposed that this version of 
                                            
30 Takashi Terada, “The Origins of Japan’s APEC Policy: Foreign Minister Takeo Miki’s Asia-
Pacific Policy and Current Implications” The Pacific Review vol. 11, no. 3. (1998). On Japan’s 
role in the formation of a Pacific Community between the late 1960s and the late 1990s see 
Pekka Korhonen, Japan and Asia Pacific Integration: Pacific Romances 1968-1996 (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
 
  
19
OPTAD would encompass all the non-communist nation-states in the 
region including some Latin American countries. As with previous 
initiatives very few governments in the region were interested in making 
a commitment to the proposal; however, it did stimulate the 
establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) 
that sought to provide a forum for academics, business representatives 
and government officials.31 The Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference (PECC), later Council, had its first meeting in Canberra in 
late 1980, and included representatives from the US, Japan, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Singapore and the Philippines. During the 1980s the governments of 
China, Taiwan, Brunei and the South Pacific Forum also began sending 
delegates to the PECC. While the PECC, brought together academics, 
business and government officials, a key characteristic of its operation 
was the unofficial role played by governments. Although the PECC has 
produced a host of reports and recommendations over the years they are 
not binding.32 
 
The establishment of APEC in 1989 underscored the important 
relationship between economic cooperation and geo-political and 
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security considerations. The Cold War had inhibited a more expansive 
regionalism in at least two ways. First, nation-states in Southeast Asia 
were wary of an organization that might have “security overtones” and 
thus limit its membership to capitalist economies, while the US was 
opposed to an organization in which the USSR might have a forum for 
the discussion of security questions.33 Against the backdrop of the end 
of the Cold War and the dramatic economic transformation of Asia over 
the preceding decades, APEC emerged as the major institutional 
expression of the idea of a Pacific Century. It represented a forum for 
the articulation and accommodation of revised and reconfigured version 
of various long-standing geo-political and geo-economic visions for the 
region. The rising neo-liberal narratives on economic development and 
international relations increasingly represented the Asia-Pacific as 
destined to become an ever more integrated region of prosperous free-
trading nation-states.34 At the same time, elites in Northeast and 
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Southeast Asia became increasingly concerned that the post-Cold War 
international political economy was shifting towards economic blocs 
centred on Western Europe (EU) and North America (North American 
Free Trade Agreement--NAFTA). APEC was challenged from the outset 
by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia: as an alternative to 
APEC, Mahathir proposed the establishment of a trading bloc, initially 
called the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), which would exclude 
the United States, Australia and New Zealand and all other “non-Asian” 
nation-states. To underline his opposition to APEC, Mahathir refused to 
attend the organization’s first heads of government meeting in Seattle in 
1993. However, by the time of the annual summit in November 1998, 
which was held in Kuala Lumpur (KL), he was the presiding host, and 
his East Asian Economic Group, under the guise of the East Asian 
Economic Caucus, had been folded into APEC.35 Apart from concerns 
about the possible formation of economic blocs in the post-Cold War era 
and the need to respond in kind, elites in Asia were also uncertain about 
the US approach to security issues after the Cold War. At the outset 
Washington was preoccupied with the situation in Europe, but in a 1991 
visit to East Asia, George Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker 
reaffirmed a US commitment to the region emphasising the continued 
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importance of Washington’s bilateral security arrangements.36 These 
arrangements maintained, in a somewhat revised fashion, the basic 
bilateral politico-military architecture of the Cold War.37 
 
This did not necessarily mean that the US actively opposed regional and 
multilateral initiatives; however, it was the Australian government that 
had taken the lead, with Japanese encouragement, in the establishment 
of APEC less than two years before. Although the Japanese government 
was as interested in trade cooperation as it was in trade liberalization, 
APEC quickly emerged as a forum for the latter. From the outset APEC 
was portrayed by many of its supporters as being committed to “open 
regionalism” in contrast to the preferential trading practices that 
characterise the EU and NAFTA.38 The Eminent Persons Group (EPG), 
which laid down much of the early organisational framework for APEC, 
made it clear that APEC would “not be a community” like the European 
Union, which is “characterised by acceptance of the transfer of 
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sovereignty, deep integration and extensive institutionalisation”. By 
contrast it emphasised that APEC would “be a community in the popular 
sense of a “big family” of like minded economies” that are “committed 
to friendship, cooperation and the removal of barriers to economic 
exchange among members in the interest of all”.39 At the same time, C. 
Fred Bergsten (former chair of the EPG and Director of the Washington-
based Institute for International Economics) emphasised that the 
organization should not only play a central role in regional trade 
liberalization, but it should also act as a “force for world-wide 
liberalisation”.40 This perspective reflected a wider view that APEC 
could play a key role in the international diffusion of economic 
liberalism.41 This vision was readily apparent at the first major meeting 
in Seattle in late 1993, and the second major meeting in Bogor, 
Indonesia in November 1994. On the final day of the Bogor meeting the 
leaders from the eighteen member countries agreed in principle to the 
virtual elimination of tariff barriers and obstacles to capital flows within 
                                            
 39 Cited in Mark Beeson and Kanishka Jayasuriya, “The Political Rationalities of Regionalism: 
APEC and the EU in Comparative Perspective” The Pacific Review vol. 11, no. 3. (1998), p. 327.  
 
40 C. Fred Bergsten, “APEC and the World Economy: A Force for Worldwide Liberalisation” 
Foreign Affairs vol. 73, no. 3. (1994). 
 
41 For example, see Ross Garnaut, Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalisation: An Asia-Pacific 
Contribution to the World Trade System (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1996). 
 
  
24
the APEC region by the year 2020 (2010 for developed nations and 
2020 for developing nations).42 
 
A NEW EAST-WEST SYNTHESIS: APEC AND THE PACIFIC 
CENTURY  
 
On the eve of the Bogor summit President Clinton emphasised his 
“vision of a new Asia-Pacific community with no artificial dividing line 
down the middle of the Pacific”.43 This meshed with an increasingly 
influential strand of the Pacific Century narrative that was grounded in 
the idea of a new East-West synthesis. The public articulation of 
synthetic visions of the region’s future by prominent politicians and 
intellectuals facilitated consensus building aimed at easing tensions in 
and around APEC. In 1992 Mark Borthwick outlined a version of this 
new vision in Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia. 
Borthwick, who worked as US director of the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC), argued that, with the end of the Cold 
War, Japan now “aspires to the leadership of a Pacific economic 
renaissance” in alliance with the US which continues to work to “bind 
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the region to its global political and economic foreign policy”.44 And, 
by the mid-1990s the idea of a new East-West synthesis for which the 
US Japan alliance served as the explicit or implicit cornerstone had 
become widespread. For example, in 1995, Tommy Koh, former 
Singaporean representative to the United Nations, argued that the new 
“Pacific Community” would be founded on a fusion of values and 
practices drawn from Asia and the West.45 Meanwhile, another senior 
Singaporean government figure, George Yeo, argued, “an East Asian 
consciousness without the softening effect of Western liberal ideas will 
not gel”.46 The emerging East-West synthesis in all its vagueness and 
ambiguity could be discerned in a book written by John Naisbitt (while 
he was a fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in 
Kuala Lumpur). According to Naisbitt, a “new network of nations based 
on economic symbiosis” was “emerging” which was founded on both a 
“spirit of working together for mutual economic gain” and a new Asian 
consciousness. The “catalyst” for all this, he said, was the “free market”, 
but the “modernization of Asia” was not the “Westernization of Asia, 
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but the modernization of Asia in the ‘Asian Way’”.47 In the following 
year, Anwar Ibrahim (former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister of Malaysia, who now languishes in jail but was widely viewed 
as Mahathir’s successor until the late 1990s) also called for a synthesis 
of East and West. In a book, entitled The Asian Renaissance, he spoke 
of the need for a “Symbiosis Between East and West”, arguing that the 
“renewed self-esteem” in Asia and the growing awareness in the West 
that Asia was “a force to be reckoned with” ought to “lead to greater 
interdependence and genuine mutual consultation in the years to 
come”.48  
 
An important example of the East-West synthesis was Asia Pacific 
Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC by Yoichi Funabashi, the former Chief 
Diplomatic Correspondent for Asahi Shimbun. Funabashi’s book was, in 
part, a reply to Samuel Huntington who had warned of the potential for 
a “clash of civilizations” in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific and 
elsewhere.49 Funabashi, who has close links to the Institute for 
International Economics in Washington and had served as head of Asahi 
Shimbun’s Washington, D.C., bureau, argued “the Asia-Pacific 
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experiment to bring the greatest civilizations of the world into one 
dynamic sphere of confluence will lead to a new era of prosperity into 
the next century”. He emphasised that “the economic and cultural 
dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, suggest that in at least this region, 
economic interdependence and cross-fertilization among civilizations 
can perhaps transcend the barriers of race and ideology”. He concluded 
that: “the growing fusion of the Asia Pacific is offering Japan” and other 
countries in the region “more room to harness elements of both East and 
West”.50 These sorts of exercises in cultural diplomacy suggest that 
APEC was emerging, prior to the Asian crisis, as not just an 
organisational attempt to facilitate trade liberalisation and advance the 
globalisation project, but as a possible embodiment of a new vision of 
the Pacific Century that ostensibly synthesised East and West. This view 
was particularly apparent at the annual APEC summit in Osaka Japan in 
November 1995. The Japan meeting produced an “Action Agenda” 
which eschewed binding trade agreements in favour of what Fidel 
Ramos (president of the Philippines) called the “Asian Way”. This 
amounted to verbal assurances by all member governments that they 
would make every effort to meet the economic liberalisation goals of 
APEC.51 The representation of this result as evidence of the “Asian 
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Way” at work was significant. Regardless of the alleged antipathy 
between a triumphant East and a defensive West which was a focus of 
debate in the early 1990s, APEC had emerged as a site for a wider 
process of elite integration in the Asia-Pacific, and this was facilitated 
by the domestication of influential East Asian narratives of progress to 
the dominant neo-liberal narrative on globalisation in the name of a new 
East-West synthesis. In this sense, the emergence of APEC was 
indicative of the post-Cold War transition to a reconfigured form of neo-
liberalism that sought to accommodate ostensibly Asian ideas and 
practices against the backdrop of the continued resilience of US 
hegemony.52 This process was also apparent at the World Bank, which 
played a very significant role in domesticating the East Asian Miracle to 
the influential neo-liberal narratives on globalisation in the 1980s and 
1990s.53 
 
The APEC process unfolded, in the context of a global politico-
economic order in which the United States was the hegemonic power. 
Furthermore, despite the efforts at elite consensus building and the 
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emerging East-West synthesis, the end of the Cold War and the 
continued spread of economic liberalism, contributed to considerable 
tension. For example, in the post-Cold War era, relations between the 
US and Japanese governments, the key axis of the new East-West 
synthesis and the wider APEC process, continued to be beset by friction 
on a range of economic issues especially related to trading practices.54 
At the same time, the ostensibly consensual character of agreements 
made at APEC meetings also pointed to the real limitations of such an 
organization, as no enforcement mechanisms were set up and no legally 
binding commitments were made. While the annual meeting in the 
Philippines in November 1996 proceeded much as earlier meetings, the 
organization’s lack of formal and binding decision-making, and its 
diverse membership was about to face a serious challenge far beyond 
the capabilities of APEC to deal with. Prior to 1997 the dominant neo-
liberal narratives on the Pacific Century rested on the assumption that 
the rise of East Asia and the end of the Cold War had produced 
increased opportunities for greater regional integration and the 
spreading and deepening of economic prosperity and political stability. 
APEC was grounded in these optimistic visions and directly implicated 
in the view that the economic trends that were carrying the region 
forward were going to continue indefinitely, delivering prosperity to an 
ever-growing number of people. This celebratory view of the Pacific 
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Century was dramatically challenged as the financial crisis, which 
ostensibly began in Thailand in July 1997, rapidly engulfed the 
region.55 
 
A NEW EAST-WEST DIVIDE: APEC AND THE ASIAN 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Within months of the fall of Thai baht in July 1997 commentators, such 
as Kishore Mahbubani (a prominent advocate of the new East-West 
synthesis), were warning that the crisis could “split” the Pacific Ocean 
“down the middle” and create “an east-west divide.”56 As long as the 
various leaders who attended APEC’s annual summits were only being 
called upon to agree to relatively distant trade liberalization targets (so 
distant that even those leaders who measured the length of their tenure 
in decades would probably not be in office when the deadline was 
reached) the meetings had proceeded with few serious problems. By the 
time of the meeting in Vancouver in November 1997, however, the East 
Asian crisis presented APEC leaders with a serious and immediate 
problem, and, not surprisingly, the 1997 APEC meeting produced little 
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of substance. In fact, by the time of the Vancouver summit, the 
organization had already become irrelevant.  
 
The prominent role the IMF began to play in the management of the 
Asian financial crisis provided the United States with the opportunity to 
pursue economic liberalization and deregulation far more effectively 
than could ever have occurred with APEC. In the second half of 1997 as 
APEC drifted to the sidelines, the IMF embarked on major efforts to 
restore financial stability to the region via loan packages to the 
governments of Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. IMF loans were 
conditional on the implementation of a range austerity measures and 
liberal economic reforms. The IMF set out to remake the financial 
systems of the various countries and was able to demand far-reaching 
regulatory reforms of a sort that were completely beyond APEC’s 
consensual, voluntaristic approach.57 These included the shutting-down 
of a range of banks and financial institutions, the liberalization of capital 
markets, and allowing foreign capital to embark on hostile acquisitions 
and mergers. The IMF’s solution to the crisis also resulted in an 
extended period of deflation and an ongoing region-wide liquidity crisis 
because it insisted on tight restrictions on public expenditure and high 
interest rates for domestic borrowers. At the same time, the IMF 
reassured foreign bankers that they would be able to collect the entirety 
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of their outstanding debts. In concert with the US Treasury and Japan’s 
Ministry of Finance, the Fund brokered the conversion of considerable 
short-term debt to long-term debt primarily by forcing the governments 
concerned to socialise private debt. The IMF also demanded that public 
enterprises be privatised and cartels be broken up. In South Korea, 
where the Fund also pushed for the introduction of flexible labour 
markets, it initially found a willing ally in the government of Kim Dae 
Jung, whose political and economic goals were strengthened by the 
early IMF demands. The same cannot be said of the cutting of food 
subsidies carried out by the Indonesian government, with IMF 
encouragement. The IMF’s austerity packaged added dramatically to the 
millions and millions of the country’s population who already lived at, 
or below, the poverty line.58 
 
The overall approach taken by the IMF reflected the dominant neo-
liberal perspective that the crisis flowed from the efficiencies and 
distortions that were characteristic of the various state-centred 
approaches to capitalist development that prevailed in East Asia (“crony 
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capitalism”).59 Of course, this view was challenged at the outset from a 
number of quarters.60 Not surprisingly, Prime Minister Mahathir was 
quick to dispute IMF explanations, at the same time as his government 
sought to avoid IMF support and interference. Mahathir and a number of 
other politicians and commentators placed the blame for the region’s 
problems at the door of foreign currency speculators. They argued that 
foreign currency traders had deliberately acted to undermine the 
economies of East Asia. In particular, Mahathir singled out the well-
known fund manager, George Soros, who he charged with 
masterminding a deliberate and pre-meditated attempt to sabotage the 
economic dynamism of Malaysia and the other countries of the 
region.61 He also criticised the IMF’s approach. Of course, long before 
the onset of the crisis, Mahathir and numerous other government 
officials and regional ideologues had questioned the relevance of 
Western ideas and practices to the region.  
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These critiques were linked to the rising Pan-Asianism that interpreted 
the Pacific Century in terms of an Asian renaissance in which Asia 
would return to centre stage in world affairs unfettered by the West 
generally and the US more specifically.62 Mahathir reaffirmed this view 
at the first Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM) in Bangkok in early March 
1996, when he asserted “Asian values are universal values” while 
“European values are European values”.63 The idea of an Asian 
renaissance and the resurgence of Pan-Asianism provided an important 
backdrop to Mahathir’s promotion of an EAEG, which he first raised 
with Premier Li Peng on a visit to China in December 1990. Mahathir 
sought to establish an exclusive Asian trading bloc on the grounds that 
Malaysia and other countries would lose out in any larger grouping such 
as APEC that included countries such as the United States. This 
eventually led to the emergence of the East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC) as part of the wider APEC process. While Mahathir’s initiative 
flowed from concerns about the membership and orientation of APEC, 
as well as the rise of NAFTA and the EU, it also represented an attempt 
to curb the growing flow of Chinese-Malaysian capital to China by 
linking China more tightly into a regional economic cooperation 
network. The EAEC proposal, which the ASEAN secretariat had put 
forward at Mahathir’s instigation, envisioned a caucus that enjoyed 
                                            
62 Mark T. Berger, “Yellow Mythologies: The East Asian Miracle and Post-Cold War 
Capitalism” positions: east asia cultures critique vol. 4, no. 1. (1996). 
 
63 Mahathir cited in “Asia and Europe: Friends Apart” The Economist March  9 (1996), p. 27.  
  
35
considerable independence within the framework of APEC and was 
made up of the governments of ASEAN plus Japan, South Korea and 
China (ASEAN+3). This line-up apparently reflected the perception in 
ASEAN that Japan and South Korea were the driving economic forces 
in the region, both of which were the source of major investment flows, 
while China was the main destination for overseas Chinese capital 
moving out of ASEAN. The exclusion of Hong Kong and Taiwan from 
this list also catered to Beijing’s sensitivities. At the same time, 
Mahathir’s vision remained focused on Japan as the leading economic 
power in the region, and a major economic force internationally: he 
foresaw the Japanese government acting as the “voice of Asia” at 
meetings of the G-7.64 
 
Japan’s economic malaise throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century 
has meant that the government and Japanese corporations have been 
unable to play as significant a role in the region in the post-Cold War 
era as many inside and outside Japan had anticipated. At the same time, 
the prevailing view in Japan prior to 1997 was that the end of the Cold 
War, combined with the economic dynamism of much of the rest of the 
region (if not of Japan itself), made it possible for the Japanese 
government to be “internationalist” and “Asianist” simultaneously. In 
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the post-Cold War era, despite ongoing friction between Washington 
and Tokyo over trade issues it was widely assumed amongst Japanese 
policy-makers that the Japanese economic presence could be extended 
ever more deeply into the region, without challenging either the US-
Japan alliance or neo-liberal forms of economic regionalism represented 
by APEC and advocated by the United States.65 In the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis, the new Koizumi government committed itself to both neo-
liberal reform and the strengthening of its alliance with the US. His 
government combined an appeal to conservative and populist neo-
nationalist ideas with a formal commitment to the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the Japanese developmental state of the Cold War era.66  
However, thus far Koizumi’s reforms of the Japanese banking system 
and other areas of the economy have been far more limited than was 
initially anticipated, or hoped for, by many observers.67 At the same 
time, the Japanese government was initially quick to support the US in 
its effort to build a global coalition to carry out its “war on terrorism”. 
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However, the exact character of that support was relatively minimal and 
it did not involve an actual Japanese military commitment.68  
 
The Japanese government’s general acquiescence to the US and the 
maintenance of the bilateral ally-client relationship of the Cold War era 
had, of course, shifted somewhat following the Asian crisis. There were 
early efforts by Tokyo to play a more significant role in handling the 
crisis. In September 1997 at a G7 finance minister meeting, Japan’s 
Finance Minister, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, first proposed the concept of an 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as a means of countering economic 
instability without the conditions attached to the IMF packages.69 
While Mahathir was attacking currency speculators at the annual IMF-
World Bank meeting in Hong Kong in mid-1997, the Japanese 
government again floated the Asian Monetary Fund idea, proposing that 
upwards of 100 billion dollars be set aside and that the institutional 
infrastructure to administer it be created, in order to be prepared for any 
future crises of the kind that was destabilising Southeast Asia.70 Not 
surprisingly, representatives from the US, Europe, and the IMF voiced 
strong opposition, while officials from Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
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Thailand expressed considerable enthusiasm. In a gesture of support, 
Thai Finance Minister Thanong Bidaya announced his government’s 
intention of lobbying for a single ASEAN currency at the December 
1997 ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur.71 Meanwhile, other East Asian 
leaders, particularly those of Singapore and Malaysia, made clear their 
frustration with the IMF’s approach to the crisis.72 
 
The Asian Monetary Fund proposal was notable in that there were to be 
no conditions attached. It would have maintained the restrictions on 
foreign ownership of financial institutions and sustained the economic 
practices that East Asian elites associate with rapid capitalist 
development. However, the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund was 
defeated at the November 1997 APEC Finance Minister’s meeting in 
Manila and the end result of the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, the 
following month, was a weak endorsement of the IMF’s plan for the 
crisis. Despite this trend, Mahathir did not abandon his pan-Asian 
vision. With the Malaysian government in the lead, a number of 
governments appeared to be drifting in the direction of capital controls 
by the end of 1998. In India and China, which had capital controls 
before the crisis started, and in a number of countries beyond Asia, 
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especially in Europe and Latin America, political support for controls on 
capital flows was on the rise.73 Prominent advocates of neo-liberalism 
were also continuing to worry about the rise of protectionist trade 
practices as a global recession loomed.74 There was evidence, however, 
that support for protectionism (at least among elites), even in many East 
Asian countries remained weak, even though the popularity of capital 
controls was rising worldwide.75  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis renovated versions of 
neo-liberalism continued to provide the dominant narratives on 
economic development and no alternative to the IMF approach gained a 
position of influence regionally or internationally. For example, prior to 
the annual APEC meeting in 1998 the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund 
was again raised.76 However, as in late 1997, no effort to implement 
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such a scheme materialised. And, if it had materialised, the US Treasury 
would undoubtedly have moved quickly to oppose it, out of concern that 
an Asian Monetary Fund would undermine the high degree of “control” 
the US exercised via the IMF.77 In fact the IMF had increasingly 
become a key instrument in the wider promotion of the globalisation 
project in this period.78 Meanwhile, the November 1998 APEC meeting 
produced even less of substance than in previous years, signalling to all 
that events would unfold despite, rather than because of APEC.79 Nor 
did an important ASEAN meeting in December 1998 result in any 
significant initiatives to address the crisis.80 ASEAN did not have the 
institutional capability or the stature to react to the crisis in an effective 
fashion. The organization’s founding principle of non-intervention in 
relation to the domestic issues of member governments has prevented a 
“comprehensive collective response”, with or without Japanese 
support.81 
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REINVENTING THE ASIA-PACIFIC: THE RISE AND FUTURE 
OF ASEAN+3  
 
In the medium-term, however, the Asian crisis and the failure of a 
number of proposed regional initiatives like the AMF had actually given 
renewed life to East Asian attempts to develop regional political 
institutions and crisis management mechanisms. If one thing became 
clear to East Asia’s political elites during the crisis and its aftermath, it 
was that East Asia remained highly dependent on, and vulnerable to, 
external forces over which regional leaders had little control. At one 
level this was apparent in the region’s exposure to massive flows of 
short-term capital in an out of the region. At another level, however, the 
crisis made clear that, absent an effective regional organisation which 
could take responsibility for responding to, or attempting to manage 
economic instability, the region would continue to remain dependent on 
external actors like the IMF and the US – with all that that implied for 
national sovereignty and independence. Unsurprisingly, then, renewed 
interest has been expressed in developing some sort of pan-Asian 
organisation of a sort championed for so long by Mahathir. It is 
significant and revealing that Mahathir – the advocate of currency 
controls and outspoken critic of “the West” – appears to have been 
rehabilitated and to some extent vindicated in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The new “war on terrorism” has also strengthened Mahathir’s ability to 
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contain his domestic opponents at the same time as his relationship with 
the US has improved. Mahathir quickly moved to align his government 
with the war on terrorism after September 11, arresting suspected 
terrorists under his government’s Internal Security Act and garnering 
praise from Washington.82 Meanwhile, often using more moderate 
language, Mahathir has continued to emphasize that “with the global 
economy in trouble, Asian countries should intensify their regional 
cooperation in trade and finance, including such initiatives as an East 
Asian Economic Grouping and a regional monetary fund”.83  
 
An examination of the emergence of ASEAN+3, however, highlights 
how difficult it will be for East Asia to develop an authoritative and 
independent regional entity along the lines envisioned by Mahathir. 
From an optimistic, if not superficial and ahistorical, point of view, 
Richard Stubbs argues that there are a number of factors which are 
encouraging the development of East Asian regionalism: first, common 
historical experiences like nationalism, and the events of the Second 
World War and Cold War; second, common cultural traits associated 
with authoritarianism and hierarchy; third, the importance of the 
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developmental state; fourth, distinctive East Asian forms of capitalist 
organisation, especially Japanese and those associated with the 
“overseas Chinese”; finally, cross-cutting investment patterns 
throughout East Asia, especially those associated with Chinese and 
Japanese capital.84 While there are serious doubts about how 
encompassing or significant some of these features may be, or how 
much they reflect a common historical experience, Stubbs does draw 
attention to some potential commonalities that could be deployed by 
elites to generate greater unity in a region that is still characterized by 
considerable diversity. In this context, it is important to note that the 
widely felt sense of resentment about the way the Asian financial crisis 
and its aftermath unfolded, especially about the activities of the US and 
the IMF over which it exerts so much influence, provided an important 
source of regional mobilization and identification and the basis for 
subsequent policy initiatives by East Asian elites.85 
 
In contrast to Stubbs’ reading of the prospects for East Asian 
regionalism, Douglas Webber argues that the ASEAN+3 initiative is 
unlikely to amount to much. Noting ASEAN’s low levels of intra-
regional trade, its diminished leadership credentials in post-crisis East 
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Asia, and its notorious lack of an effective capacity with which to 
implement and/or enforce policy, Webber concludes that “the vast intra-
regional political-systemic disparities pose an extremely high obstacle to 
the development of much closer inter-state cooperation”.86 And yet 
Webber also notes two other distinguishing qualities of East Asia’s 
putative regionalism: that ASEAN+3’s rise has been stimulated 
primarily by the actions of the US generally and the IMF specifically; 
and that the “distinguishing” characteristic of “East Asian regionalism” 
is the fact “its initial focus has been less on trade than on money”.87 
 
Both of these observations are important and merit further explication as 
they tell us much about both the contradictory course of East Asian 
regionalism and about the continuing influence of US power in the 
region. It might be expected that given East Asia’s – or more 
specifically, China and Japan’s – formidable monetary reserves,88 the 
chance to develop an effective regional monetary mechanism that 
allowed both governments to display their regional leadership 
credentials would prove irresistible. Both the Japanese and Chinese 
governments have certainly attempted to use the crisis and its aftermath 
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to bolster their respective positions. China’s leaders have made clear 
that they feel their actions as good international economic citizens in 
providing stability during the financial crisis were undervalued, while 
Tokyo continues to try and entrench itself at the heart of the region’s 
production networks and trade relations. However, the principal obstacle 
to greater regional integration led by either Japan and/or China would 
not seem to be any bilateral tensions between the two regional giants, 
nor even Japan’s well-known reluctance to do anything that might upset 
Washington. On the contrary, both China and Japan continue to cede 
authority for the conduct of regional monetary relations to the IMF – 
concerned, as they both are, about the implications of underwriting 
open-ended commitments to their regional neighbours in nascent 
currency swap arrangements.89 In other words, the emphasis of the 
governments of China and Japan on their national, rather than regional 
interests, appear to be constraining developments in the one area – 
monetary cooperation – in which the region seems capable of making 
substantive progress. 
 
This contradiction can be clarified by recognising the limits that the 
wider global political economy – which the United States has played 
such a pivotal role in constructing and managing – imposes on the 
national economic spaces embedded within it. The growing power of 
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financial capital in particular has been at the forefront of the 
construction of an international economic order that is characterized by 
a growing disjuncture between economic activities in the “real” 
economy of goods and services production and an expanding and 
increasingly deregulated financial system. In such circumstances, and 
absent a systematic attempt to impose capital controls of a sort 
championed by Mahathir,90 even the region’s more powerful and 
independent economies will be constrained by the capacity of “Wall 
Street” to translate its narrow sectional interests into global public 
policy.91  US power, therefore, mediated through key financial sector 
institutions, such as the IMF, continues to impose limits on the possible 
trajectory of East Asian development and regional integration. The the 
underlying significance of U.S. foreign policy generally and the IMF’s 
efforts specifically during the Asian financial crisis was to bring an end 
to the era in which the developmental states of East Asia, such as South 
Korea and Japan, had flourished. The US and the IMF also sent a clear 
signal to China that made clear  a desire to prevent it emerging as 
“another Japan”.92 
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Neither of the alternative contenders for regional leadership –Japan and 
China – is well placed to seriously challenge US hegemony. In post-
Cold War East Asia a “rough balance of power” exists in which the US 
has the overall advantage and this will continue for some time. In 
particular China’s nuclear capability and large standing army is “offset” 
by the economic significance of Japan, not to mention the large 
conventional forces on the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and in Vietnam. 
Japan has, throughout much of the twentieth century, been a 
“subordinate partner” in either a U.S. hegemonic project or an earlier 
U.S.-British hegemonic alliance.93 Against this backdrop, and at a time 
when China’s political elite is attempting to manage its continued 
integration into the global capitalist economy via membership of the 
World Trade Organisation, and when Japan’s government remains 
preoccupied with its apparently interminable and unresolvable economic 
malaise, the prospects for regional cohesion and solidarity do not appear 
bright. Indeed, it is important to remember that China’s rapid economic 
development is a major threat to the smaller economies of Southeast 
Asia, and suggestions that integration be consolidated through an 
ASEAN-China free trade agreement might be seen as making the best of 
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a bad job as far as the ASEAN states are concerned.94 If nothing else, 
the outbreak of bilateralism across the region is further confirmation of 
the demise of APEC’s multilateral trade liberalisation agenda. At the 
same time, Japan continues to exert a powerful influence over Southeast 
Asia in particular, an influence that has a contradictory rather than a 
straightforward unifying effect on the region.95 
 
Despite these significant obstacles, and despite the fact that the original 
ASEAN countries will inevitably risk being overshadowed by their 
larger neighbours, ASEAN+3 remains a continuing source of regional 
initiatives and diplomacy. Significantly, the region’s political elites have 
been prominent participants in what have become regular summits, and 
this has been supported by an increasingly substantial array of 
ministerial and functional meetings. It is not necessary to 
unambiguously endorse the claim that the nation-states that belong to 
ASEAN+3 “are definitely relinquishing autonomy in their quest for 
greater stability and prosperity”.96 But it is necessary to recognise that 
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something significant is happening in the region, something that is 
intended to give organisational expression to the political and economic 
ambitions of East Asian elites. At a time when the US economy is not 
simply looking less robust and more crisis prone, but is associated with 
precisely the same sort of “crony capitalism” that was previously 
viewed by a number of observers as the key to the Asian crisis, there are 
grounds for assuming that the ideological or discursive component of 
US hegemony will be less compelling in Asia.97 By extension, this may 
open up a space for alternative Asian economic and political visions, a 
space that regional elites will use ASEAN+3 to fill if they prove capable 
of overcoming intra-regional tensions and their historical subordination 
to US power. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE HISTORY AND LIMITS OF THE NEW 
REGIONALISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
 
This paper looked at the history of, and limits to, APEC and ASEAN+3 
in the context of the changes to and continuities in US power in 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. New or revised forms of regionalism in 
East Asia or the Asia-Pacific, which remain relatively weak in contrast 
to Western Europe and North America, were examined against the 
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backdrop of the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. 
Some observers, view the geo-political and economic shifts in the 1970s 
in East Asia as more important than the end of the Cold War in 1989. 
Nevertheless, the waning of Soviet power altered the dynamics of the 
United States-China relationship, while the post-Cold War era also saw 
increased friction in Washington’s relationship with Tokyo around 
efforts by Washington to promote the globalisation project in the region. 
This latter trend came to a head with the Asian crisis in 1997-1998. The 
crisis facilitated U.S. efforts, via the International Monetary Fund, to 
further wind back state-guided national development as it had emerged 
in various significant, even paradigmatic, forms in East Asia. The crisis 
also stimulated or reinvigorated various regional initiatives outside of 
APEC, as the relative unimportance of APEC and the relative impotence 
of the Japanese government were both highlighted by the financial 
crisis. At the beginning of the 1990s, meanwhile, U.S.-China relations 
entered a new and more difficult era related in part to China’s 
emergence as a major economic force in the region and beyond. This is 
linked to the Chinese government’s enhanced defence spending, 
military reorientation and upgrading. The events of September 11th 
(2001) and October 12th (2002), however, are powerful indicators of 
how rapidly new issues can re-shape the regional and global order. The 
reassertion of US military pre-eminence, Washington’s insistence that 
governments declare their support for its “war on terrorism” and the 
relative alacrity with which Tokyo and Beijing aligned themselves at 
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least tactically with the US after 9/11 has the potential, at least in the 
short term, to subordinate virtually all other issues to a global security 
agenda.98 In the longer-term, however, it is reasonable to assume that 
other, ostensibly East Asian concerns will reassert themselves. In such 
circumstances, ASEAN+3 is likely to provide a far more significant 
forum for canvassing issues of regional importance than APEC ever did. 
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